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A B S T R A C TObjective: Productivity costs are usually estimated by multiplying
the wage with the period absent. This can lead to an overestimation
if compensation mechanisms occur. Until now only Dutch data are
available on the influence of compensation mechanisms on lost
productivity, but between-country differences in frequency and type
of compensation mechanisms can be expected. The objective of this
study was to understand whether compensation mechanisms for
days absent from paid work differ in type and frequency across
countries and to explore whether this would result in between-
country differences in relevant lost productivity. Methods: Data
from a cross-sectional survey among respondents with rheumatic
disorders from four countries were the basis for this study. Analyses
focused on respondents with paid employment who reported
absence in the last 3 months. The different compensation mecha-
nisms are described and the resulting lost productivity in terms of
days absent was calculated with and without taking compensation
mechanisms into account. Logistic regression analyses weresee front matter Copyright & 2013, International
r Inc.
.1016/j.jval.2013.03.1624
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ondence to: S. Knies, Dutch Healthcare Insurance Bperformed to examine which variables influence compensation
mechanisms leading to relevant lost productivity. Results: The
results indicate that compensation mechanisms occur and are
relevant in all four countries. Between-country differences in the
type and frequency of compensation mechanisms and relevant lost
productivity were observed. The logistic regression analyses indi-
cate that, correcting for other variables, this is also the case for the
use of compensation mechanisms leading to relevant lost produc-
tivity. Conclusions: Between-country differences in compensation
mechanisms in case of absenteeism exist and could vary to such an
extent that foreign relevant lost productivity data should be used
with caution.
Keywords: between-country comparison, compensation mechanisms,
lost productivity, rheumatic disorders.
Copyright & 2013, International Society for Pharmacoeconomics and
Outcomes Research (ISPOR). Published by Elsevier Inc.Introduction
It is well known that between-country differences exist in lost
productivity due to health problems, not only with regard to work
disability but also with regard to sickness absence [1]. The
differences can only partly be explained by patient character-
istics such as educational level, sex, age, job type, and severity of
disease because system characteristics such as regulations and
allowance regarding sickness absence and the rules and amount
of the disability insurance play an important additional role [1].
Previous research suggested that in case of short-term absentee-
ism, compensation mechanisms at the workplace can occur,
which would influence the estimates of productivity costs of
the individual for the workplace or for society [2,3]. The com-
pensation of long-term absenteeism is taken into account when
calculating productivity costs by using the Friction Cost Method,
but not when using the Human Capital Approach and explainsthe large differences in the estimations of the productivity costs
based on both approaches [4]. In this study, the focus will be the
compensation of short-term absenteeism and explores possible
between-country differences in these mechanisms.
When productivity costs are included in economic evalua-
tions, the costs of days absent from paid work are commonly
estimated by multiplying the patients’ wages with the time
absent. It was suggested, however, that these methods might
overestimate productivity costs because they do not take into
account compensation mechanisms [2]. Taking into account
short-term compensation mechanisms could considerably
decrease the estimated productivity costs based solely on the
time absent of the individual worker. This is because time absent
that is compensated for in normal working hours will not result
in societal productivity losses, while compensating lost produc-
tivity during extra working hours requires extra time and thus
additional costs. While it can be expected that the occurrence ofSociety for Pharmacoeconomics and Outcomes Research (ISPOR).
se of the authors and should not be attributed to the authors’
relevant to the content of this article.
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VA L U E I N H E A LT H 1 6 ( 2 0 1 3 ) 7 4 0 – 7 4 4 741such compensation mechanisms might also be country specific,
this has never been studied. Up to now, only two studies have
been performed on the influence of short-term compensation
mechanisms on lost productivity and both studies were con-
ducted in The Netherlands. It was shown that productivity costs
taking compensation mechanisms into account were ranging
from only 23% up till 33% of the costs when not taking compen-
sation mechanisms into account [2,3,5]. In the present study, it is
first explored whether compensation mechanisms for days
absent from paid work differ in type and frequency across
countries and second whether this would result in between-
country differences in relevant lost productivity. Patients with
rheumatic disorders were considered because it is known that
they have a high frequency of sick leave.Methods
In a cross-sectional study a questionnaire was sent in March 2010
to 200 respondents with a rheumatic disorder in one of four
countries: The Netherlands, the United Kingdom, France, and
Germany. Data were collected by research organization TNS NIPO
by sending members of the patient panel ‘‘rheumatic disorders’’ a
link to an online questionnaire. The potential respondents were
eligible when they had a rheumatic disorder and were between 20
and 65 years of age. The authors developed the questionnaire and
carried out the data analyses. For the analyses of the present
study, we focused on respondents with paid employment who
reported absence in the last 3 months. More details about the
study design and questionnaire can be found in Knies et al. [1].
As part of the Productivity and Disease Questionnaire [6],
working respondents who reported absence in the last 3 months
were asked how their absence was compensated for. The
respondents could choose between six possible compensation
mechanisms, being self-compensation in normal hours or in
extra hours, compensation by colleagues in normal hours or in
extra hours, compensation by extra workers, or work was not
compensated. In addition, a ‘‘do not know’’ option was added.
Patients could indicate more than one compensation mecha-
nism, but it was not possible to indicate to what extent their
absence was compensated for and which mechanism was the
most common. In the analyses, it was therefore assumed that the
mechanisms in which extra hours or extra workers were needed
were dominating, thus being more important than the other
compensation mechanisms. In addition, it was assumed that
when the first five mechanisms were reported, all lost produc-
tivity due to absence was compensated for.
Descriptive statistics were used to compare the demo-
graphics, occupational characteristics, disease severity (level of
restriction on a three-point scale), and the reported presence of
compensation mechanisms across the four countries.
To examine the role compensation mechanisms play in lost
productivity, first the mean number of days absent for each
country was calculated, without accounting for compensation
mechanisms. Since in the questionnaire, the number of days
absent in the past 3 months was collected, the lost productivity
represents a 3-month period. Next, two approaches were used to
calculate the lost productivity taking compensation mechanisms
into account. In the first valuation approach, compensation led to
relevant lost productivity when extra hours (colleagues, them-
selves, or hiring additional employees) were needed to compen-
sate the absence of a sick respondent. Relevant lost productivity
is that portion of the lost productivity that is not compensated for
within normal working hours. When using the alternative valu-
ation approach, it was assumed that relevant lost productivity also
occurred when the subjects indicated that lost productivity was
not compensated for [3]. In both valuation methods, relevant lostproductivity was calculated as the number of days absent leading
to relevant lost productivity.
In logistic regression analyses, the independent contribution
of country of residence to compensating mechanisms after
adjusting for disease severity and work characteristics was
explored. The dependent variable was compensating mecha-
nisms leading to relevant lost productivity versus compensating
mechanisms without relevant lost productivity. The independent
variables comprised country of residence and personal (sex, age,
educational level, and disease severity) and occupational charac-
teristics (occupational level, part-time work, irregular shifts, and
management position). Dummy variables were used for country
of residence (three dummies), education, and occupation (both
two dummies). Except for the dummy variables for country of
residence, nonsignificant independent variables were deleted
step by step when their P value was higher than 0.10, each time
deleting the variable with the highest P value. This process was
continued until only significant variables were left. For the final
model with only significant variables, the significance of the
three dummy variables that represent country of residence was
examined.Results
Out of 800 respondents 539 had a paid job and 167 of them
reported absenteeism in the last 3 months. The personal, disease,
and occupational characteristics of the respondents being absent
are reported in Table 1. In the United Kingdom, significantly more
men reported absenteeism than in Germany and France. The
British respondents have the highest educational level, and the
French respondents are more frequently seriously restricted
because of their disease. France and The Netherlands had the
most respondents with a part-time job. Respondents are grading
the relationships with colleagues similar across the four coun-
tries, but the number of colleagues with the same work differs. In
The Netherlands, on average, 5.3 colleagues have similar work
compared with 103 colleagues in the United Kingdom, which is
due to three respondents reporting an extremely large number of
colleagues with the same work. German and Dutch respondents
work less often in shift work. The average monthly salary is
lowest in The Netherlands, likely as a result of a high proportion
of respondents who work part-time.
The different compensation mechanisms and their reported
frequency are given in Table 2. Because respondents could report
multiple mechanisms, the cumulative percentage of compensa-
tion mechanisms is above 100%. In all four countries, the lost
productivity is most often compensated by colleagues in their
normal working hours. In The Netherlands, France, and Ger-
many, the second most reported mechanism is doing the work
self during normal working hours after returned to work, but in
the United Kingdom this is the fourth most common mechanism.
The second most reported mechanism in the United Kingdom is
hiring extra workers, while in the other three countries this is the
least frequently mentioned mechanism. Absence is not compen-
sated in 9.5% (France) to 19% (United Kingdom) of the cases, and
4.3% (Germany) to 11.9% (France) of the respondents did not
know how their lost work was compensated for.
The average number of days of lost productivity without
taking compensation mechanisms into account differs largely
between the four countries. The average ranges from 11.4 days in
The Netherlands, around 20 days in Germany and the United
Kingdom to 26.5 days in France. The percentages of respondents
for whom compensation mechanisms are used that resulted in
relevant lost productivity vary from 21.1% (The Netherlands) to
36.2% (Germany) of respondents and varied from 31.0% (France)
to 48.9% (Germany) when also including the frequency of
Table 1 – Personal, disease, and occupational characteristics of those reporting absence from work in the
past 3 mo.
The
Netherlands
The United
Kingdom
France Germany
Respondents who reported absenteeism (% of working
respondents)
57 of 173 (32.9) 21 of 116 (18.1) 42 of 129
(32.6)
47 of 121
(38.8)
Personal characteristics
Males, n (%) 21 (36.8) 10 (47.6) 17 (40.5) 15 (31.9)y,z
Mean age (y) (range) 45.5 (28–63) 47.5 (23–63) 44.3 (28–56) 45.7 (23–63)
Educational level, n (%)y
Lower education 15 (26.3)y 2 (9.5)J,z,# 19 (45.2) 20 (42.6)
Middle education 28 (49.1)z,# 11(52.4)z,# 9 (21.4),yy 11 (23.4),yy
Higher education 14 (24.6),y,z 8 (38.1)J 14 (33.3)J 16 (34)zz
Disease characteristics
Years of rheumatic disorder (range) 13.7 (2–42) 8.7 (1–24) 12.6 (1–34) 11.0 (1–39)
Restricted by disease (0–2)
Seriously restricted, n (%) 9 (15.8),z, 5 (23.8)z 14 (33.3)y,yy 13 (27.7)J
Somewhat restricted, n (%) 41 (71.9)z,# 15 (71.4)z,# 23 (54.8),yy 29 (61.7),yy
Occupational characteristics
Relation with colleagues— scale 0–10 (10 best) 7.7 7.7 7.6 7.8
Colleagues with same work, n (range) 5.3 (0–30)  103 (0–1000),z,yy 35.2 (0–300)y 13.2 (0–100)y
Part-time work (o36 h), n (%) 29 (50.9), 6 (28.6)z,yy 25 (59.5), 17 (36.2)z,J
Shift work, n (%) 10 (17.5)z, 9 (42.9)z,#,yy 26 (61.9)y,#,yy 6 (12.8)y,z
Management position, n (%)yy 10 (17.5) 5 (23.8) 11 (26.2) 11 (23.4)
Occupational level, n (%)yy
Lower occupation 5 (8.8) 5 (23.8) 6 (14.3) 4 (8.5)
Middle occupation 36 (63.2) 12 (57.1) 27 (64.3) 28 (59.6)
Higher occupation 16 (28.1) 4 (19.1) 9 (21.4) 15 (31.9)
 P o 0.05 with Germany.
y Po 0.05 with the United Kingdom.
z Po 0.05 with France.
y Lower education: preparatory vocational education, preparatory general secondary education; middle education: higher general secondary
education, preparatory university education, intermediate vocational education; higher education: higher vocational education, university
education.
J Po 0.05 with The Netherlands.
z Po0.01 with France.
# Po0.01 with Germany.
 Po0.01 with the United Kingdom.
yy Po0.01 with The Netherlands.
zz Respondents are considered to have a management position when they indicated to have an executive function.
yy Lower occupation: elementary and lower-level employment; middle occupation: intermediate-level employment (executive), intermediate-
level employment (nonexecutive), company owner/director (o10 employees), company owner/director (410 employees), self-employed
professional; higher occupation: higher-level employment (executive), higher-level employment (nonexecutive), farmer/market gardener.
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information was used to calculate which part of the lost produc-
tivity would remain when taking the compensating mechanisms
into account. The lowest percentage of the remaining lost
productivity could be found in The Netherlands with only 12%
of the initial lost days being relevant, and the highest percentage
of the remaining lost productivity could be found in the United
Kingdom with 50%. As expected, these differences became even
larger (19.8% in The Netherlands vs. 82.2% in the United King-
dom) when using the alternative valuation method, in which the
lost days that were not compensated for are also assumed to
result in lost productivity at the workplace.
The results of the logistic regression analyses exploring the
adjusted contribution of country of residence to the use of com-
pensating mechanisms resulting in relevant lost productivity as
defined according to two different approaches can be found in
Table 3. The results of the first analyses showed that living in
Germany instead of in The Netherlands, being somewhat restricted
versus not restricted, and having a middle or high occupationversus having a low occupation increase the chance of having used
a compensation mechanism leading to relevant lost productivity.
The chance of relevant lost productivity however decreases when
being older, when not working part-time, when not working in
shift, or when having a management position. The results of the
alternative valuation are somewhat similar: the chance of the
occurrence of relevant lost productivity increases when living in
the United Kingdom or Germany instead of in The Netherlands and
when being seriously or somewhat restricted versus somewhat
restricted. Being older or not having a management position
decreases the chance of having relevant lost productivity when
absent from work.Discussion
The results of our explorative study indicate that compensation
mechanisms for short-term absenteeism from paid work are
important in the four countries, but differences in the type of
Table 2 – Lost productivity and compensation mechanisms as reported by respondents.
The Netherlands
(n ¼ 57)
The United Kingdom
(n ¼ 21)
France
(n ¼ 42)
Germany
(n ¼ 47)
Mean number of days absent (range) 11.4 (0–65) 21.9 (1–91) 26.5 (1–92)y 19.8 (0–90)
Compensation mechanisms (%)
Colleagues during normal hours 56.1 38.1 38.1 29.8
Colleagues during extra hours 7 9.5 7.1 12.8
Extra workers 7 28.6 7.1 4.3
Self during normal hours 22.8 14.3 26.2 27.7
Self during extra hours 8.7 0 7.1 19.1
Work not compensated 10.5 19 9.5 12.8
Compensating mechanisms not known 7 4.8 11.9 4.3
Number of respondents using compensation
mechanisms leading to relevant
lost productivity (%)z
12 (21.1)y 6 (28.6) 9 (21.4)y 17 (36.2)
Number of respondents using compensation
mechanisms leading to relevant lost
productivity, alternative valuation method (%)z
19 (33.3)y,# 10 (47.6) 13 (31.0)y,# 23 (48.9)
Days out of total number of days absence
in the last 3 mo leading to relevant lost
productivity when taking into account
compensation mechanisms (%)
1.4 (12.5)y, 10.9 (50.1)y 6.4 (24) 7.4 (37.2)y
Days out of total number of days absence in the
last 3 mo leading to relevant lost productivity when
taking into account compensation mechanisms
under the alternative valuation method (%)
2.3 (19.8)y, 10.9 (82.2)J,yy 6.4 (27.4) 7.4 (50.4)y
Note. Total percentages are higher than 100% because respondents could report more than one compensation mechanism.
zz P o 0.01 with Germany.
 P o 0.05 with France.
y Po 0.05 with The Netherlands.
z Only when extra hours (by the respondent’s colleagues or respondent) or extra workers were needed to compensate the lost productivity, this
was considered relevant lost productivity.
y P o 0.05 with Germany.
J Po 0.01 with France.
z Here lost productivity was considered relevant not only when extra hours or extra workers were needed to compensate the productivity loss
but also when the productivity loss was not compensated for.
# Po 0.05 with the United Kingdom.
 Po 0.01 with the United Kingdom.
yy Po 0.01 with The Netherlands.
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be found. The between-country differences remained in multi-
variable modes that were adjusted for patients and job character-
istics. In The Netherlands, the difference between lost
productivity with and without relevant compensating mecha-
nisms is the highest because most work is compensated in
normal working hours. Previous research indicated that 23% to
33% of the absences result in relevant lost productivity [2,3]. Our
results confirm this figure for France (24%–27.4%), but revealed
larger proportions of relevant losses for the United Kingdom
(50.1%–82.2%) and smaller proportions for The Netherlands
(12.5%–19.8%), indicating between-country differences. All rela-
tions with the explanatory variables as found in the logistic
regression analyses were as expected.
The present study has a number of limitations. The first and the
main limitation is that because of the explorative nature of our
study it was not possible to correct for all factors that may influence
the use of compensation mechanisms. Job type is one of these
factors that could influence the amount of lost productivity and the
type of compensation mechanisms. In our study, we had only
limited information on the occupation of the respondents. In
further research, the influence of job types on compensation
mechanisms and possible between-country differences in thisrelationship should be investigated by using detailed information
on job type. More importantly, this study calls for research to better
understand which system characteristics contribute to the large
between-country differences we observed in the use of compensa-
tion mechanisms. Second, it was assumed that lost productivity
was completely compensated when one of the first five compensa-
tion mechanisms was chosen by the respondents. It was not
possible for the respondents to indicate the extent of the compen-
sation. Therefore, full compensation was assumed, which is not
realistic because it is more likely that only a part of the lost
productivity is compensated for. More research is needed to further
refine the methods to determine the extent of the compensation
mechanisms and their influence on relevant lost productivity. In
addition, it is possible that there are between-country differences in
the degree that lost productivity is compensated for. Third, in our
sample only respondents with rheumatic disorders were included
to have a sample with a relatively homogeneous disease state of
which it is known that sick leave occurs quite frequently. Although
it might well be that in other disease areas similar compensation
mechanisms occur, the results cannot be generalized to other
disease areas. Finally, some researchers suggest that the costs of
lost productivity of the absence of an employee can be higher than
the actual days lost because the absence can hamper the
Table 3 – Logistic regression of variables related to compensating mechanisms leading to relevant lost
productivity.
Standard valuation method Alternative valuation method
OR 95% CI lower-upper bound OR 95% CI lower-upper bound
Country
UK vs. The Netherlands 1.415 0.791–2.532 0.558 0.365–0.855
France vs. The Netherlands 1.085 0.679–1.734 1.075 0.751–1.540
Germany vs. The Netherlands 0.517y 0.353–0.758 0.526z 0.379–0.731
Personal characteristics
Age (y) 1.046y 1.026–1.067 1.014y 0.999–1.030
Restricted by disease
Seriously restricted vs. not restricted 1.174 0.606–2.276 0.561 0.334–0.943
Somewhat restricted vs. not restricted 0.486J 0.276–0.856 0.658y 0.412–1.052
Occupational characteristics
Part-time work (1: yes, 2: no) 1.351z 0.977–1.868 – –
Shift work (1: yes, 2: no) 2.153y 1.405–3.299 – –
Management position (1: yes, 2: no) 2.277y 1.445–3.589 1.449 1.036–2.026
Occupational level
Middle occupation vs. lower occupation 0.524J 0.311–0.881 1.012 0.663–1.545
High occupation vs. lower occupation 0.324y 0.179–0.586 0.750 0.467–1.204
 Note R2 ¼ 0.056 (Nagelkerke): Po .05.
y Note R2 ¼ 0.122 (Nagelkerke): P o 0.001.
z Note R2 ¼ 0.056 (Nagelkerke): P o 0.001.
y Note R2 ¼ 0.056 (Nagelkerke): P o 0.10.
J Note R2 ¼ 0.122 (Nagelkerke): P o .05.
z Note R2 ¼ 0.122 (Nagelkerke): Po 0.10.
VA L U E I N H E A LT H 1 6 ( 2 0 1 3 ) 7 4 0 – 7 4 4744productivity of their direct colleagues or workplace. This is espe-
cially true in case of teamwork where the work is time dependent
and thus cannot be postponed [7,8]. These potential effects were
not measured in the present study and thus could not be consid-
ered in the lost productivity calculations.
The large changes in lost productivity when accounting for
compensation mechanisms suggest that compensation mecha-
nisms should also be considered in the national pharmacoeco-
nomic guidelines. First, more research should be done, however,
on the extent to which the different compensation mechanisms
at an individual level occur, and which factors can explain the
difference in the occurrence of compensation mechanisms
across countries. It should also be explored how a sick employee
affects the productivity of his or her direct colleagues because
their productivity might depend on the work of their absent
colleague [7,8]. The ISPOR Task Force on Transferability con-
cluded in its report that there are several important methodo-
logical and practical issues when transferring economic data
because there is evidence on the variability of economic data
between countries [9]. The between-country differences found in
reported compensation mechanisms are so large that data on lost
productivity solely measured in terms of days absent likely
cannot be transferred across countries without adaptation.
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